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Problem Statement 
To conduct a critical investigation into how adverse events following mass 
immunization (AEFIs) for women and children are reported and investigated in 
Afghanistan and to create an operational tool for follow-up investigations of AEFIs. 
Overview of the Project 
The purpose of this project was to assist the Afghanistan Ministry of Public 
Health (MOPH, 2002) in developing guidelines for a tool to conduct follow-up 
investigations of AEFIs. Mass immunization campaigns are currently the main venue for 
eradication (polio), elimination (measles), and prevention (tetanus) efforts for children 
and women in Afghanistan. If AEFIs are not followed up carefully and promptly, serious 
AEFIs can erode public confidence in vaccines and contribute to poor immunization 
coverage. 
Background 
In the past 35 years, childhood immunizations have become one of the most 
efficient and cost effective public health preventative measures in both developed and 
developing countries. As a result, millions of children have been saved from crippling 
and fatal consequences from vaccine preventable diseases (Hadler, Cochi, Bilous, & 
Cutts, 2004). In fact, with the exception of safe water, no other intervention, not even 
antibiotics, has had such a major effect on mortality reduction and population growth 
(Plotkin, & Plotkin, 2004). Vaccines have not only assisted with disease prevention and 
control such as measles elimination programs but disease eradication, with smallpox 
eradication in 1980 and the prediction of eminent eradication of polio by 2006 (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 2004). 
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It is estimated that globally, 70% of the world’s children are receiving the 
traditional childhood vaccination series of bacilli Calmette-Guerin (BCG); oral poliovirus 
vaccine (OPV); diphtheria, tetanus toxoid, and whole-cell pertussis (DTP); and measles 
(WHO, 2002). Aside from strong immunization programs in affluent countries, the 
improving vaccine coverage in developing countries is occurring largely as a result of 
WHO’s Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), a program that was established in 
1974 as an initiative to increase global immunization programs. The main target is to 
provide immunization against tuberculosis, tetanus, diphtheria, polio, and measles for all 
children, and against tetanus for all women of child-bearing age in underdeveloped 
countries (WHO, 1999). 
Aside from disease prevention, vaccines are also considered one of the safest of 
health interventions (Chen, Davis, & Sheedy, 2004). The importance of keeping vaccines 
safe is a balance between risk and benefit. To maintain this balance, immunization safety 
is necessary both from an individual and a societal perspective (Chen et al., 1994). As 
vaccine-preventable diseases become less visible through effective immunization 
programs, more public attention will be focused on vaccine-related adverse events. 
Whether these events are only coincidental or caused by vaccine, AEFIs will become 
more prominent (Chen et al., 1994). 
As immunization programs in developing countries mature, monitoring and 
assessment of suspected vaccine-related adverse events is critical to immunization safety. 
In recognition of this and the increasing use of vaccines, WHO (1991) recommended that 
all countries adopting national EPI programs implement surveillance for AEFIs. The 
surveillance system is necessary to prevent loss of confidence and public trust in vaccine 
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programs, decreased vaccine coverage, and the return of epidemics of disease (Pless, 
Bentsi-Enchill, & Duclos, 2003). 
In 1977, MOPH for Afghanistan adopted and implemented the WHO EPI 
framework (as cited in MOPH, 2002). However, for the last two and a half decades, the 
EPI program and general health care infrastructure has been severely disrupted as a result 
of war and political instability. Hence, the WHO (1991) implementation of surveillance 
for AEFIs has not yet occurred. Although gains have been made in reestablishing a 
functional regional EPI management system, EPI in Afghanistan remains far from 
attaining the desired coverage and consistency of routine service delivery (United 
Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2004b). 
Consequently, in Afghanistan, health indicators are among the lowest in the 
world. The infant mortality is estimated to be 165 per 1,000 live births and the under-5 
mortality rate is estimated at 257 per 1,000 (UNICEF, 2002). Measles and other vaccine- 
preventable diseases are responsible for significant morbidity and mortality among 
children. Although surveillance systems are limited, passive measles surveillance 
conducted by the sentinel sites for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in 
Afghanistan reported 8,762 measles cases in 2001. In addition, a study conducted in 
Kohistan district in northeast Afghanistan found that 16% of deaths in children aged 
greater than 5 years were due to measles (Assefa, Jabarkhil, Salama, & Spiegel, 2001). A 
(2003) survey to determine maternal mortality rates conducted by UNICEF, the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the Afghanistan MOPH reported that in some 
remote areas, up to 25% of neonatal deaths are attributable to neonatal tetanus. Maternal 
mortality rates were reported as high as 1,600 per 100,000 deliveries (UNICEF, 2002). 
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Finally, an ongoing pertussis outbreak in Badakshan and Darwaz provinces resulted in 
115 cases and 17 deaths in children under 5 years of age and further illustrated the burden 
of vaccine-preventable diseases in Afghanistan (WHO, 2002). 
Vaccine coverage rates in Afghanistan have remained consistently low throughout 
the last decade, with BCG at 56%, DPT (3doses) at 54%, measles coverage of children 
age one year estimated at 50%, polio (3 doses) at 54% in 2003 (UNICEF, 2004a). With 
such low measles coverage, estimating a conservative case fatality rate of 5%, WHO 
(2002) estimated that there were 35,000 measles related deaths in children 15 years of 
age and younger in Afghanistan in 2001. In reality, this number may have underestimated 
measles deaths because of an underestimation of the population (there has been no census 
since 1979) and the likelihood that the measles-specific conservative case fatality rate in 
Afghanistan is higher than 5%. The low vaccination coverage increases the risk of 
outbreaks, as evidenced by the ongoing pertussis outbreak mentioned previously. 
In response to the low vaccine coverage and high impact of vaccine-preventable 
diseases, the MOPH, along with UNICEF and WHO, has conducted a number of national 
immunization days (NIDs) for polio, subnational immunization days for polio, and 
measles campaigns (measles mortality reduction campaign [MMRC]) since 2001. In 
addition, an ongoing national maternal and neonatal tetanus campaign began in February 
2003 and will be conducted in phases until 2006. All of these campaigns in Afghanistan 
have achieved significant success to date. The number of polio cases recorded in 2004 
reduced to 4 cases from 150 cases in 1999. An estimated 10.2 million children have been 
vaccinated for measles since 2002 (WHO, 2004). 
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Given the limited capacity to improve vaccine coverage through routine 
immunization services, campaigns are expected to be the major mode of improving 
vaccine coverage in the near future. These mass campaigns will lead to more vaccine 
reactions as well as more coincidental events just by virtue of the increase in numbers of 
people vaccinated. A well-functioning AEFI reporting and response system is critical to 
respond quickly to reports of AEFIs, which will assist to minimize their negative impact 
on community confidence as vaccination programs develop. 
Although Afghanistan is a country that is making strides to improve its 
immunization practices, threats to the success of campaigns in Afghanistan can be related 
to insecurity, a lack of resources, and AEFIs. The purpose of this project was to address 
the latter of these caveats by completing a comprehensive and systematic review of 
AEFIs related to mass immunization campaigns and then to assist the MOPH in the 
development of an operational tool for use by MOPH EPI staff when an adverse event 
occurs during or following mass immunization campaigns. 
Conceptual Framework 
The author utilized Evans and Stoddart’s (1990) health field model to develop a 
framework for the study (see Figure 1). This model, which was based on the determinants 
of health, provided a broad, multidimensional framework and directed attention to 
different types of factors and forces that can interact on different conceptualizations of 
health (Evans & Stoddart). The model encompasses eight factors: social environment; 
physical environment; genetic endowment; prosperity; well-being; health care; disease; 
and health function; and shows how the these factors impact on behavior (Evans & 
Stoddart). 
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Figure 1. Evans and Stoddart’s (1990) health field model. 
The model lent itself well to designing a health improvement project such as a 
tool for AEFI follow-up because how a health behavior is understood is subject to the 
impact of multiple forces, for example, social and physical environments. This behavior 
can be a relevant target for intervention, but it is also shaped by the forces acting upon it. 
In the case of Afghanistan, unstable social and physical environments have impacted the 
health and well-being of the country greatly. 
The author examined this model from a broad perspective to the extent of the 
health of a nation rebuilding an economic base and improving public health interventions 
such as immunization. This positive move forward will result in a sense of self- 
confidence and pride as well as improved health behavior. As Evans and Stoddart (1990) 
noted, a country that sees itself as hard working, becoming richer, and showing economic 
promise will yield health benefits. 
The health field model (Evans 8L Stoddart, 1990) also shows how disease can 
influence health and purpose, which influence well-being. It can be used to assess both 
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the positive and, in the case of AEFIs, the negative factors that affect the health of a 
nation. Although these factors can be overlapping, such as the social and physical 
environments, these factors also are interrelated. Evans and Stoddart suggested that the 
interrelatedness among factors may prove to be more important than the actions of any 
single factor and that the outcomes are the product of complex interactions of the factors 
rather than of individual factors operating in isolation. 
The author included an example to show how this interrelatedness is relevant to 
AEFI follow-up in Afghanistan and how an intervention to improve health, such as 
follow-up for AEFIs, can be influenced by many factors in the model: For example, if a 
child has an adverse event related to immunization, such as an infection from a poor 
immunization technique, it can be compounded further by the child’s poor nutritional 
status and result in a longer healing time. Another example focuses on the many children 
with challenges related to the close blood relationship of their parents. Interfamilial 
marriage among close family is a common practice in Afghanistan (Jalal, personal 
communication. May 17, 2004). In an audiotaped speech to MOPH officials in 2004, 
Jalal stated: 
An estimated 4% to 10% of the Afghan population has physical disabilities. 
Those acquired at birth, including mental retardation, reflect the low level of 
antenatal care, inadequate treatment of infectious diseases, and cultural practices 
such as the intermarriage of first cousins. 
If the children are challenged either mentally or physically, they are often kept sheltered 
in the home, and parents may refuse to bring them out, even for immunizations. This 
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illustrates how genetic endowment, which is unchangeable, also may impact a health 
intervention. 
Evans and Stoddart’s (1990) multidimensional approach allowed the author to 
look at fields that are not traditionally encompassed by the medical model in assisting the 
MOPH with the development of a tool for AEFI follow-up. The author was able to assist 
the MOPH to recognize that many factors influence health and that these factors should 
be considered before implementation of a health intervention. 
Literature Review 
To assist the methodology and development of a tool for follow-up of AEFIs, the 
author reviewed all major content areas of adverse event follow-up, including (a) a 
definition and historical overview of AEFIs, (b) a definition and historical overview of 
mass immunization campaigns, (c) global reporting strategies for AEFIs during mass 
immunizations, and (d) Afghanistan’s current strategies for follow-up of AEFIs. 
History and Definition of AEFIs 
In 1999, WHO defined an AEFI as “a medical incident that takes place after 
immunization, causes concern and is believed to be caused by immunization” (p. 9). Pless 
et al. (2003) commented that AEFI implies no attribution of causality; rather, it merely 
suggests that something (an event) happened “after” the immunization. They suggested 
that an adverse “reaction” can be defined as any “untoward” event where the causal 
relationship supports an association. WHO organized AEFIs into five categories: 
1. A vaccine reaction is an event caused by or precipitated by the vaccine when 
given correctly, caused by inherent properties of the vaccine. It can be either a common, 
minor reaction or a more serious, rare reaction. 
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2. A program error is an event caused by an error in the preparation, handling, or 
administration of the vaccine. It is preventable and detracts from the overall benefit of the 
immunization program. 
3. A coincidental event happens after the immunization, but it is not caused by the 
vaccine. This is a chance, temporal association and is falsely considered to be caused by 
the immunization. It is often inevitable after giving a large number of doses, such as in a 
mass campaign. 
4. An injection reaction is an event from anxiety about or pain from the injection 
rather than the vaccine. Individuals and groups can react in anticipation to and as a result 
of an injection of any kind. 
5. An unknown cause is one that cannot be identified. 
WHO (1999) classified the “cause” of the event into one of six categories: very 
likely/certain, probable, possible, unlikely, unrelated, and unclassifiable. The first three 
classifications are used when vaccine reactions or program errors are suspected, 
categories four and five are used for coincidental events, and category six is used when 
there is insufficient evidence to make an assessment (WHO). 
AEFI follow-up is a relatively new concept, despite the fact that vaccines have 
been in existence for more than a 100 years. The history of AEFIs is largely connected to 
a fear of compensation claims and support from anti-immunization lobbyists in 
developed countries that was first documented in 1967 by Sir Graham Wilson, a former 
director of Public Health Laboratory Science in the United Kingdom (UK; Chen et al.. 
2004). 
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During this time, the UK was also responding to the thalidomide tragedy and a 
routine surveillance system for vaccine-associated adverse events was implemented 
(Salisbury, 2002). This was followed in 1986 by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act established in the United States to review the adverse events related to childhood 
vaccinations. In 66% of the adverse reactions that were reviewed, there was either no 
scientific evidence or inadequate evidence to judge for or against a causal link to vaccines 
(Howson, Howe, & Fineberg, 1991). The reasons for this scarcity of knowledge included 
limitations related to a lack of understanding of the underlying biological mechanisms 
associated with vaccines, poor case reporting, inadequate size and length of studies 
related to vaccine, lack of systematic surveillance, very few published epidemiological 
studies, and the costs of vaccine research (Stratton, Howe, & Johnson, 1994). As a result 
of this earlier work, methods of monitoring immunization safety, including strict pre- and 
postlicensure monitoring of vaccine manufacturers worldwide and surveillance systems 
for those agencies that deliver vaccines, have now been implemented in developed 
countries and most developing countries. 
Definition and History of Mass Immunization Campaigns 
A mass immunization campaign refers to a program that is taken to most of a 
group of people within a short time frame at specific times during a year; covers a large 
population, where large numbers of doses of vaccine are given; and is organized usually 
at a central level (Dietz & Cutts, 1997). In contrast to this are routine immunization 
programs, where people attend a health center or receive mobile services on a regular 
basis. By virtue of the number of doses of vaccine given during a mass campaign, there is 
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a direct correlation between the doses of vaccine given and the numbers of expected 
AEFIs (Pless et ah, 2003). 
Mass campaigns have been in existence since the late 1800s, when the first 
recorded mass immunization took place in 1899 when a scientist, Almouth Wright, began 
field trials for typhoid fever by vaccinating 4,000 Indian Army volunteers. Following 
“satisfying” results, he proceeded to vaccinate 14,000 volunteers from the British Army 
(Plotkin & Plotkin, 2004). After the Second World War, with the creation of WHO in 
1948, mass campaigns became common as an important strategy to control disease and 
improve vaccine coverage in underdeveloped countries with poor health care 
infrastructures (WHO, 1988). Early campaigns, however, failed to achieve sustained 
control of diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. This led critics to state that in the 
absence of strong health care service infrastructures, there was little capacity for 
campaigns to maintain adequate vaccine coverage (Shepard et ah, 1989). 
Since the 1990s, mass immunization campaigns have become a strategy for 
disease control and eradication rather than an improvement of vaccination coverage. 
WHO (1999) recommended mass immunization as a key strategy for the eradication of 
polio and the control of measles. The secondary effect of mass immunization campaigns 
is that health care infrastructures such as cold chain equipment, educational materials, 
and linkages between providers and communities remain in place in many developing 
countries following campaigns (WHO, 2002). 
In developed countries, mass immunization campaigns have been useful in 
introducing selective vaccines to restricted populations, such as in Canada, when yearly 
influenza vaccine is given to those in risk categories (Orenstein, Rodewald, & Hinman, 
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2004). In a mass immunization campaign in Quebec, in 1993, 1.6 million children and 
young adults under the age of 20 were immunized in an attempt to control sero group C 
meningococcal disease. This vaccine covered 84% of the target population and had an 
overall efficacy rate of 79%. De Wals et al. (1996) suggested the existence of herd 
immunity as a secondary result of this vaccination campaign. Some limits to this study 
existed. For example, because there was no control group, indirect protection afforded by 
the vaccine could not be measured, and there was no mention of AEFIs during this 
campaign. 
In developed countries, considering the number of immunizations suggested for 
children, mass campaigns are not recommended as a major means of improving overall 
vaccine coverage. For example, in Canada, children receive in excess of 20 doses of 
vaccine by 18 months of age; therefore, it is too complex to deliver vaccines in mass 
campaigns (Public Health Agency of Canada [PHAC], 2002). 
Global Reporting Strategies for AEFIs during Mass Immunizations 
Vaccines today protect nearly three quarters of the world’s children against major 
childhood illness (UNICEF, 2004a). As indicated earlier, AEFIs can be causally related 
to the inherent properties of vaccines or linked to program errors, but it must be 
recognized that when large populations are vaccinated, some serious events that occur 
rarely with or without vaccination will be observed coincidentally following vaccination 
(WHO, 2002). 
To date, intensive surveillance of adverse events during mass campaigns has 
taken place mainly in developed countries that have existing monitoring systems (Pless et 
al., 2003). Canada’s current vaccine safety system for reporting AEFI is the Canadian 
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Adverse Events Following Immunization Surveillance System (CAEFISS). In this 
system, all professionals involved in the administration of vaccines are encouraged to 
report and potential vaccine-associated adverse events to their local public health 
authorities (PHAC, 2003). This is a passive surveillance system, and reporting rates vary 
because some areas in Canada, but not in all provinces and territories, have legislated 
jurisdiction over reporting. An expert review advisory committee with volunteer 
membership meets twice a year with a mandate to select potential vaccine-related adverse 
event cases for review and to determine if they are linked causally to vaccines. Findings 
are communicated to the provinces and the territories, but the dissemination of this 
information is left to their discretion. In 2004, there were more AEFIs reported through 
this system than the total number of cases of reportable vaccine-preventable diseases 
(PHAC). 
Studies showing Canada’s history with mass immunization AEFI follow-up is 
relatively recent. One report (Sciberras, 1996) described a mass immunization campaign 
in Ontario in 1995 where measles vaccine was given. AEFIs were reported using 
CAEFISS. More than 1,869,000 doses of monovalent measles vaccine was administered 
to children aged 4 to 19 years of age, and 751 adverse event case reports submitted. 
Sciberras suggested that following the expert committee review, most events were 
thought to be unrelated to immimization. 
In British Columbia, 703,850 children aged 18 months to 7 years were vaccinated 
with measles rubella vaccine in 1996, and 462 AEFIs were reported in this target group 
(65.6/100,000). There was one serious AEFI reported as anaphylaxis, but the remaining 
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reactions were expected: rashes, joint swelling, and “measles-like illness.” The AEFIs 
were reported using CAEFISS (Daly & Pielak, 1997). 
New Zealand’s system for monitoring AEFIs is the Center for Adverse Reactions 
Monitoring (CARM). This, too, is a passive monitoring system. It receives spontaneous 
reports from doctors, nurses, and the public. Then on a monthly basis the reports are 
entered into a database. The information gathered by CARM is provided to the Medicines 
Adverse Reactions Committee quarterly and to WHO’s Collaborating Center for 
International Drug Monitoring. Despite the ongoing collection of data and monitoring, 
there is no immediate, up-to-date, accessible information about the incidence of AEFIs in 
New Zealand (Miller &Tumer, 2002). 
When New Zealand conducted a mass measles immunization campaign in 1997, 
adverse events were collected through CARM. Reporting rates of AEFIs were lower 
during the campaign year than in subsequent years. For example, in 1997, there were 43.6 
AEFIs reported per 100,000 estimated vaccinations, as compared to the two previous 
noncampaign years when the rates were 67.8 and 61.4 per 100,000 administered 
vaccinations (Pless et al., 2003). The researchers reported that the decreased rates of 
AEFIs in the campaign year were the result of the nonconcomitant administration of 
toxoid vaccines that normally are given during routine immunizations. 
In the developing world, most of all EPI vaccines are supplied by UNICEF 
through WHO-recommended sources. Through a process of prequalification, WHO 
advises UN procurement agencies on the quality, efficacy, and safety of vaccines 
available, and vaccines are purchased accordingly. Surveillance of AEFIs is not 
consistent in EPI programs; in 2000, 42% of all EPI programs reported that they had 
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some monitoring for immunization safety in place. Of these, fewer than 50% had 
programs that met the WHO (2002) regulatory authority criteria for functioning systems. 
In Romania, a mass measles vaccination campaign occurred between October 
1998 and January 1999. During this period, more than 2 million school-aged children 
received measles and rubella vaccines. Surveillance for AEFIs during the campaign 
followed WHO’s AEFI surveillance guidelines because there were no preexisting 
systems in place for monitoring AEFI. In total, 128 adverse events, including fainting, 
allergic reaction, and possible anaphylaxis, were reported (lon-Nedelcu, Craciun, & 
Pitigoi, 2001). 
In 2000, South Korea responded to an increase in measles cases by implementing 
a 10-week mass immunization campaign. AEFIs were monitored using a coordinated 
system of vaccine safety monitoring that was introduced in 1999. In all, 1,199 reports of 
AEFI were received, and nearly 5 million doses of vaccine were given. Only 2 serious 
AEFIs were found to be “probably” related to immunization (Yang, 2001). 
In Costa Rica, a mass campaign was launched to eliminate rubella and congenital 
rubella syndrome in 2001. There were 1,635, 445 doses of measles and rubella vaccine 
administered to people aged 15 to 39. AEFIs were reported using the Costa Rica Social 
Security System, a passive reporting system that monitors vaccine safety. There were 981 
adverse events reported (60/100,000 doses), but the symptoms, such as headache, fever, 
rash, and arthralgia, were mild and expected (CDC,.2001). 
Even though most AEFIs are mild, they are a cause for concern and must be 
investigated. If they are not responded to promptly, serious AEFIs may cause the public 
to perceive that vaccines are harmful. This misconception can erode public confidence in 
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vaccines and may contribute to decreased immunization rates, which may lead to a 
resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases. 
Afghanistan’s Current Strategies for Follow-Up ofAEFI 
Afghanistan is a country that has struggled through decades of war. It continues to 
rank among the worst in the world in basic health indicators such as infant and maternal 
mortality. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the MOPH of the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan, with assistance from international organizations, has started to rebuild the 
health infrastructure, but insecurity and resource issues continue to plague the country, 
and the rebuilding process is slow. 
Health care to the average citizen is limited. The physician-to-patient ratio is 
8:100,000 in rural areas and 1:1,000 in Kabul, where only 12% of the population lives. 
Hospitals are limited to provincial capitals, and the capacity for caring for the ill is 
generally poor. Nearly 6% of people admitted to hospital do not recover, and more that 
50% of these patients are children (Reilly, Puertas, & Coutin, 2004). 
Currently, the majority of health care in Afghanistan is provided through 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 80% of functional health care facilities have 
some form of support from these organizations, which often includes medicine and other 
basic equipment (WHO, 2002). UNICEF (2004a) provides 100% of Afghanistan’s 
vaccines and funds the MOPH to provide vaccinations for children through the MOPH 
and EPI, but as many as 45% of children still do not have access to immunization 
services. 
Important progress has been made in measles vaccinations and other 
immunization programs, as discussed earlier. This progress has had a rapid effect on 
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improving the health of children and women; therefore, it is important not to jeopardize 
this progress with a poor response by health care providers to AEFIs. Prior to this project, 
there has been no formal reporting system for AEFI follow-up in Afghanistan. In a study 
published in 2003, Dadgar et al. described the implementation of a mass measles 
campaign in central Afghanistan from December 2001 to May 2002. They reported that 
“adequate” injection safety was observed during monitoring, however; there was “no 
systematic monitoring of AEFI” (p. SI 88). 
AEFI surveillance has not until now been adopted in Afghanistan, and to the 
author’s knowledge, there are no published studies related directly to AEFI in 
Afghanistan to date. EPI managers report anecdotally to WHO or UNICEF offices in 
their areas, but no processes are in place to capture and analyze this information. The 
author found five documented but unpublished reports of AEFIs between 2002 and 2004. 
Three of the reports were deaths related to anaphylaxis following a measles campaign, 
one was related to abscesses following a measles campaign, and one localized reaction 
was related to tetanus immunization. However, based on the number of campaigns that 
took place in Afghanistan during this time, one would expect to see more AEFIs. There 
were at least 12 countrywide mass campaigns for polio, 3 countrywide campaigns for 
measles, and ongoing tetanus campaigns for childbearing women during this period 
(UNICEF, 2005). 
An expected anaphylaxis reaction to measles vaccine is 1:1,000,000 (WHO, 
1999). Therefore, given that 10,000,000 children were immunized against measles in 
2003 alone, there should have been at least 10 expected cases of severe AEFIs. The lack 
of reports of AEFIs in Afghanistan cannot be attributed only to a lack of a coordinated 
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surveillance system. It is exceedingly more complex when there are insecurity issues, a 
minimal health care infrastructure, and communication deficits. A coordinated, well- 
functioning AEFI reporting and response system is critical to responding quickly to 
reports of AEFIs. This will help to minimize the negative impact of AEFIs on community 
confidence in vaccination programs and decrease the potential threat to the health of 
children and women experiencing adverse events. 
Methodology 
In 2004, the Afghanistan MOPH’s EPI Division requested assistance from the 
author to assist in developing guidelines for reporting and investigating AEFIs 
specifically related to mass immunization campaigns. This was the result of previous 
assistance from the author on vaccine-preventable disease surveillance while working 
with UNICEF Afghanistan. 
In preparation for the development of the guidelines, the author reviewed the 
literature on AEFI with a specific focus on mass campaigns using Evans and Stoddarf s 
(1990) field health model as a framework. The author, along with the national EPI 
manager in Afghanistan, then prepared a cross-sectional descriptive survey for regional 
EPI managers. These surveys would be done independently and returned to the national 
EPI manager. Although the survey could be described as a mail survey, there is no 
reliable postal service in Afghanistan, therefore most surveys were hand delivered and 
hand returned. 
Neutens and Rubinson (2002) noted that surveys are widely used in health 
research and are often the basis for program planning. They also suggested that mailed 
questionnaires are advantageous because they are inexpensive, allow access to wider 
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geographical areas, and convenient for the respondent, interviewer bias is eliminated, 
greater anonymity is assured, and all respondents receive the same questions. Some 
concerns associated with mail surveys are: some questions will probably be left 
unanswered, there may be low response rates, there is an inability to record spontaneous 
comments or use complex questions, and there is no guarantee that the surveys will be 
returned on time. 
The Survey 
The survey method was chosen to assist the author in understanding what 
currently is being done in each EPI region to follow up AEFIs. In addition, the survey 
method is traditionally used in Afghanistan for other health-related issues such as 
assessing nutritional status and vaccine coverage rates. The development of the survey 
was done via e-mail correspondence between the author and the national EPI manager 
and was pretested on EPI managers in the Kabul area. This pretest was done to assess the 
viability of the survey and literacy level. The questionnaire was then revised based on the 
pretest, and the target was expanded to include regional EPI managers, provincial EPI 
managers, and anyone who was delivering the EPI. The rationale for expanding the target 
population was to be more inclusive of the MOPH EPI staff who were providing direct 
EPI services. 
The survey had three objectives: 
1. To assess the level of understanding and experience that MOPH staff delivering 
EPI services had with AEFI follow-up. 
2. To assess the resources that MOPH staff have to assist with AEFI follow-up. 
3. To identify what resources MOPH staff need to assist them with AEFI follow-up. 
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Unfortunately, because of security reasons, the author was unable to be in 
Afghanistan for the needs assessment, but the author had recently worked with the 
national EPI manager and was confident in his ability to administer the survey. Thirty- 
five questionnaires (see Appendix A) were distributed to 12 regional EPI managers in 
Kabul on February 7, 2005. The regional EPI managers present were to complete the 
survey and distribute the remaining copies to provincial EPI managers and other MOPH 
staff delivering EPI services in their region. The surveys were distributed by February 22, 
2005, and returned by March 27, 2005. 
Survey Results 
Twenty questionnaires (57%) were returned to the national EPI manager by March 27, 
2005. The results, sent to the author via e-mail, were as follows: 
1. 50% of responders identified themselves as EPI managers (40% of these also 
identified themselves as physicians), 25% were polio officers, 20% were vaccinators, and 
5 % were nurses. 
2. 65% of respondents had seen adverse events, which they described as shock, 
blisters, abscesses, bruises, hives, rash, paralysis, and death. 
3. 35% had not seen an adverse event. 
4. Of the 65% who seen an adverse event: 
■ 80% reported that they would help the child. 
■ 20% reported that they would tell the EPI manager. 
■ 10% reported that they would report it to the polio officer. 
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5. 13% of responders stated that they had a guide from WHO on how to follow 
adverse events, 87% reported that they did not have resources but would like a 
“book” or “someone to help them.” 
6. 95% of responders stated that they would like clear guidelines to follow, a clear 
reporting structure, and training. 
7. 5% stated that they would like to go to another country for more training. 
Survey Limitations 
There were a number of limitations to this survey: (a) The author had no control 
over the explanation of the study questions to the participants because it was 
administered by the national EPI manager; (b) only those participants who attended the 
initial meeting in Kabul could ask questions about the survey, whereas the other 
participants could not; (c) the survey was written in English, and this is not the mother 
tongue of the participants, although staff working for EPI are to have a “working 
knowledge” of English; (d) the response rate was lower than the author had expected; and 
(e) because of the poor infrastructure (e.g., unreliable mail and telecommunication 
systems), some questionnaires may have become lost in transit. 
Next Steps 
Following the survey, a round table discussion on the survey results and the next 
steps was held. In May 2005, the author was able to travel to Afghanistan and attend this 
round table meeting of EPI managers from across Afghanistan. At this meeting, the 
author and the national EPI manager presented the results of the survey, provided 
education on AEFIs, and began discussions on the next steps. The discussions from this 
early meeting guided the next actions, which included a review of the literature, a 
conceptual framework, the formation of a subcommittee of EPI managers who would 
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assist the author in the development of guidelines as well as an education component for 
AEFI follow-up. 
Draft guidelines were developed for Afghanistan, using an existing framework 
from WHO (1999). The rationale for using these guidelines was that: 
1. The existing WHO framework is being used in developing nations that have 
implemented the EPI. 
2. WHO’s AEFI framework is part of the larger EPI framework. 
3. If changes in WHO’s AEFI framework occur, the Afghanistan MOPH can easily 
adapt the document to reflect the changes. 
Discussion 
Because health care and the health care infrastructure in Afghanistan are limited, 
AEFI follow-up and surveillance have been haphazard and have been restricted to 
surveillance during and after mass campaigns and only as anecdotal reports. With the 
implementation of AEFI guidelines, a coordinated effort will assist in limiting the 
reactions that can be caused by AEFIs. 
Although the public health infrastructure in Afghanistan continues to improve 
with enhanced surveillance of vaccine-preventable diseases, the same principles of AEFI 
surveillance can be gradually introduced and can apply to routine EPI service. The 
follow-up tool for AEFIs, which was developed as a stand-alone resource and/or field 
guide, will assist MOPH EPI staff in their investigations. The author reminds the reader 
that some of the information in the tool may be a repetition of information previously 
discussed in the paper. “Summary” boxes are scattered throughout the AEFI follow-up 
tool. These will provide field staff with a quick synopsis of the data. 
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The AEFI Follow-Up Tool 
Purpose 
This document provides a guideline for managers and others responsible for 
immunization programs on the surveillance and appropriate response of AEFIs in 
Afghanistan. This document was developed specifically to enhance the recording and 
monitoring of AEFIs and is particularly targeted at the ongoing campaign for measles 
elimination. This document was adapted with permission from WHO (1999). 
Adverse Events Following Immunization 
As mentioned previously, vaccines used in Afghanistan’s national EPI are 
extremely safe and effective. However, no vaccine is perfectly safe, and adverse events 
can occur following immunization. In addition to the vaccines themselves, the process of 
immunization is a potential source of adverse events. An AEFI is any adverse event that 
follows immunization that is believed to be caused by the immunization. AEFIs fall into 
five categories (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Classification of AEFIs 
Vaccine reaction: 
Program error: 
Coincidental: 
Injection reaction: 
Unknown: 
AEFI caused or precipitated by the vaccine when given correctly; caused 
by the inherent properties of the vaccine. 
AEFI caused by an error in vaccine preparation, handling, or 
administration. 
AEFI that happens after immunization, but is not caused by the vaccine - 
an association due to chance. 
AEFI from anxiety about, or pain from, the injection rather than the 
vaccine. 
Cause of the AEFI cannot be determined. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 9. 
Vaccine Reactions 
Measles vaccine, which has been used since 1963, has an excellent safety record. 
It does commonly cause minor reactions and, rarely, more serious reactions (see Table 2). 
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Measles is a live virus vaccine, and most reactions result from a vaccine virus infection 6 
to 12 days after immunization. 
Measles vaccine infection causes fever, rash, and/or conjunctivitis, and affects 5% 
to 15% of nonimmune vaccines. It is very mild, as compared to “wild” measles, but in 
severely immunocompromised individuals, it can be severe. Current WHO advice is to 
immunize all children with measles vaccine, regardless of HIV status, and there is no 
need to screen for HIV status beforehand. However, a child who is seriously ill with HIV 
or any other cause should not be vaccinated. 
Thrombocytopenia (low platelet count) can occur with any viral infection. It 
manifests by bruising and is usually mild and self-limiting. Although encephalopathy has 
been identified as a rare reaction to the measles vaccine, it is unclear if it is a true reaction 
to the measles vaccine or simply a coincidental event. The measles vaccine can also 
cause a local reaction at the injection site as well as allergic reactions that can rarely be 
very severe: anaphylaxis. Anaphylaxis, while potentially fatal, is treatable without any 
long-term effects. 
Similarly, other vaccines can result in reactions. Most reactions occur within a 
day or 2 of immunization and usually last for a few days. Most of these reactions are 
minor, resolve without treatment, and do not lead to long-term problems. Important 
vaccine reactions observed with different antigens and their relative frequency are 
outlined in Table 2. The figures in Table 2, which were adapted from WHO (1999) can 
be used to calculate the anticipated rate and type of reactions for specific immunization 
campaigns, identify adverse events that are unlikely to be related to the vaccination, and 
compare reported rates with expected rates of reactions. 
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Health care providers should be aware of the common adverse events following 
vaccination. Parents should be informed of the common reactions following 
immunization, for example, the possibility of mild measles 6 to 12 days following 
immunization. Advice should include home management of mild adverse events and 
instructions to seek treatment at health facilities in the case of severe symptoms. This will 
serve to reassure parents and prepare them for mild adverse events. 
Common vaccine reactions, namely, fever and pain, can be treated with 
Paracetamol (acetaminophen) 15 mg/kg every 4 hours for 3 to 4 days. In addition, 
adequate fluids and tepid sponging may be given to febrile cases. For minor local 
reactions, application of a cold compress may ease pain. 
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Table 2 
Vaccine Reactions, Onset Interval, and Rates 
Vaccine Reaction Onset Interval Doses per Reaction 
Measles/ Local reaction at 
MMR/MR* injection site 
Fever >38 deg C 
Rash 
Febrile seizures® 
Thrombocytopaenia 
(low platelets) 
Anaphylactoid (severe 
allergic) reaction 
Anaphylaxis 
Encephalopathy 
Local reaction at Tetanus 
OPV 
DTP 
BCG 
injection site 
Fever >38 deg C 
Irritability, malaise and 
systemic symptoms 
Brachial neuritis 
Anaphylaxis 
Fever >38 deg C 
Irritability, malaise and 
systemic symptoms 
Vaccine associated 
paralytic poliomyelitis 
Local reaction at 
injection site 
Fever >38 deg C 
Irritability, malaise and 
systemic symptoms 
Brachial neuritis 
Persistent inconsolable 
screaming (>3 hours) 
Seizures^ 
Hypotonic 
Hyporesponsive Episode 
(HHE) 
Anaphylaxis 
Encephalopathy 
Local reaction at 
injection site 
Suppurative 
lymphadenitis 
BCG osteitis 
Disseminated BCG 
infection 
0-2 days 
6-12 days 
6-12 days 
6-12 days 
15-35 days 
0-2 hours 
0-1 hour 
6-12 days 
0-2 days 
0-2 days 
0-2 days 
2-28 days 
0-1 hour 
0-2 days 
0-2 days 
4-30 days 
0-2 days 
0-2 days 
0-2 days 
2-28 days 
0-24 hours 
0-2 days 
0-24 hours 
0-1 hour 
0- 2 days 
2-4 weeks 
2-6 months 
1- 12 months 
1-12 months 
~1 inlO 
1 in 6 to 1 in 20 
~ 1 in 10 
1 in 3,000 
1 in 30,000 
~ 1 in 100,000 
~ 1 in 1,000,000 
< 1 in 1,000,000 
1 in 10 
1 in 10 
1 in4 
0.5 - 1 in 100,000 
1 in 100,000 to 1 in 
2.500.000 
< 1 in 100 
< 1 in 100 
1 in 2.4-3 million 
Up to 1 in 2 
Up to 1 in 2 
Up to > 1 in 2 
0.5-1 in 100,000 
1 in 15 to 1 in 1,000 1 
1 in 1750 to 1 in 
12,500 
1 in 1,000 to 1 in 
33.000 
1 in 50,000 
0 -1 in 1 million 
~ 1 in 1 
1 in 1,000 to 1 in 
10.000 
1 in 3,000 to 1 in 100 
million 
~ 1 in 1 million 
Reactions per Million 
Doses 
(-10%) 
(5%-15%) 
(-5%) 
330 
30 
~ 10 
~ 1 
< 1 
~ 10%-^ 
- 10% 
- 25% 
5-10 
0.4-10 
< 1% 
< 1% 
-0.4 
Up to 500,000 (50%) 
Up to 500,000 (50%) 
Up to 550,000 (55%) 
5-10 
,000-60,000 (0.1%-6%) 
80-570 
30-990 
20 
0-1 
90%-95% 
100-1,000 
0.01-300 
0.19-1.56 
* Reactions (except local reaction and anaphylaxis) do not occur if already inunune (~ 90% of those receiving a second dose). 
® Children over 6 are unlikely to have febrile seizures. 
# Seizure risk is age dependent and lower for older children. 
^ Rate of local reactions is likely to increase with booster doses, up to 50% to 85%. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 11. 
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Program Errors 
Program errors result from errors and accidents in vaccine preparation, handling, 
or administration (see Table 3; WHO, 1999). They are preventable and detract from the 
overall benefit of the immunization program. The identification and correction of these 
errors are of critical importance. 
A program error may lead to a cluster of events associated with immunization. 
These clusters are usually associated with a particular provider, health facility, or even a 
single vial of vaccine that has been inappropriately prepared or contaminated. Program 
errors can also affect many vials (e.g., by freezing vaccine during transport, leading to an 
increase in local reactions). 
Table 3 
Program Errors Leading to Adverse Events 
Program Errors Adverse Events 
Nonsterile injection: 
reuse of disposable syringes or needles, 
improperly sterilized syringes or needles, 
contaminated vaccine or diluent, 
reuse of reconstituted vaccine at a subsequent 
session. 
Infection (e.g., local suppuration at injection site; 
abscess; cellulites; systemic infection; sepsis; toxic 
shock syndrome; transmission of blood-bome 
virus (e.g., HIV, hepatitis B, or hepatitis C). 
Vaccine prepared incorrectly: 
vaccine reconstituted with incorrect diluent. 
drugs substituted for vaccine or diluent. 
Local reaction or abscess from inadequate shaking. 
Effect of drug (e.g., muscle relaxant, insulin). 
Vaccine injected at wrong site: 
subcutaneous instead of intradermal for BCG. 
too superficial for toxoid vaccine (DPT, TT). 
buttocks. 
Local reaction or injection site abscess. 
Local reaction or injection site abscess. 
Sciatic nerve damage. 
Vaccine transported/stored incorrectly. Increases local reaction from frozen vaccine (and 
ineffective vaccine).   
Contraindications ignored. Avoidable, severe vaccine reaction. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 13. 
The most common adverse event resulting from program error is infection. 
including blood-bome vims, because of nonsterile injection. The infection can manifest 
most commonly as a local reaction (e.g. suppuration, abscess). In addition, abscesses may 
arise from an inappropriate injection technique as well as the use of an inappropriate 
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diluent. Less commonly, children vaccinated with a contaminated vaccine may develop 
systemic infection (e.g., sepsis or toxic shock syndrome), or a blood-bome virus infection 
(e.g., HIV, hepatitis B or hepatitis C). 
It is critical to detect clusters of adverse events due to program errors. In the case 
of campaigns, these clusters could amount to a large number of cases, so their earliest 
identification with an appropriate response is crucial in maintaining the community’s 
confidence in immunization programs (see Appendix B). Loss of community confidence 
can lead to decreased uptake during the remainder of the campaign as well as lower 
uptake of routine EPI services, as evidenced following the cluster of abscesses after the 
MMRC campaign in Nahrin district (Araki, in press). Response would entail the 
identification and elimination of the cause (corrective action) followed by an appropriate 
explanation of the situation to the community. To avoid program errors; 
1. Vaccines must be reconstituted only with the diluent supplied by the 
manufacturer. 
2. Reconstituted vaccines must be discarded at the end of each immunization 
session. They must never be retained. 
3. No other drugs or substances should be stored in the refrigerator of the 
immunization centre. 
4. Immunization workers must be adequately trained and closely supervised to 
ensure that proper procedures are being followed. 
5. Careful epidemiological investigation of an AEFI is needed to pinpoint the cause 
and to correct immunization practices. 
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Coincidental Events 
An event may occur coincidentally with immunization and, at times, may be 
falsely attributed to the vaccine. In other words, a chance temporal association (i.e., an 
event happens after immunization) is falsely considered to be caused by the 
immunization. These purely temporal associations are inevitable, given the large number 
of vaccine doses administered, especially in a mass campaign. 
Coincidental AEFIs are predictable. The number of AEFIs to be expected depends 
upon the size of the population and the incidence of disease or death in the community. 
Knowledge of these background rates of disease and deaths allows an estimation of the 
expected numbers of coincidental AEFIs. For example, assume that one million children 
aged one to 15 years are immunized in a mass campaign and that the background 
mortality rate for this population is 3 per 1,000 per year. Therefore, 250 deaths can be 
expected in the month after immunization and 8 deaths on the day of the immunization 
simply by coincidence. These deaths will be temporally associated with, even though 
entirely unrelated to, the immunization campaign. 
It is important to keep the possibility of coincidental events in mind. Once an 
AEFI is confirmed to be coincidental, the fact that it is not associated with the vaccine 
should be communicated clearly to the community. 
Injection Reactions 
Individuals and groups can react in anticipation of or because of an injection of 
any kind. This reaction is unrelated to the content of the vaccine. Fainting is relatively 
common, but it usually only affects children over the age of 5 years. Fainting does not 
require any management beyond placing the patient in a recumbent position. 
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Hyperventilation because of anxiety about the vaccination leads to specific symptoms 
(i.e., light-headedness, dizziness, tingling around the mouth and in the hands). An anxiety 
reaction to injection may include convulsions in some cases. 
These reactions are not related to the vaccine, but to the injection. Some 
individuals may be afraid of needles, thus aggravating such reactions. In a group 
situation, mass hysteria is possible, especially if onlookers see the individual faint or have 
another reaction. Clear explanations about the immunization and calm, confident delivery 
will decrease the level of anxiety about the injections and reduce the likelihood of an 
occurrence. In some campaigns, injection reactions are the commonest adverse event. It 
is important to make the vaccinators aware of the possibilities of such events so that they 
are not unexpected. This is especially important in campaigns in which older children 
(adolescents) are being vaccinated. 
Establishing AEFI Surveillance 
In Afghanistan, given the limited public health infrastructure, it is unrealistic to 
expect a comprehensive surveillance system that will detect all cases of AEFIs. In 
addition, minor AEFIs may overwhelm the health care system if they are all reported. 
Further, rare cases of vaccine reactions may not be detected and may be difficult to verify 
in the absence of laboratory confirmation. 
However, a system to detect clusters of cases following a campaign is important. 
Preventing AEFIs is crucial, but should they occur, responding quickly and appropriately 
is equally important. These clusters, as mentioned earlier, are usually the result of 
program errors, so their early detection enables swift action to address these errors. 
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Objectives 
AEFI surveillance in Afghanistan should aim to: 
1. Detect program errors so that they can be addressed quickly and prevented in the 
future. 
2. Maintain the confidence of the community in immunization services by 
responding rapidly to reports of AEFIs, communicating the findings to the community, 
and providing reassurance. 
3. Ensure that coincidental events are not falsely blamed on vaccinations. 
Responsibility for AEFI Surveillance 
In Afghanistan, the MOPH should be responsible for all matters pertaining to 
AEFIs. At the central level, the MOPH national EPI manager will be the person 
responsible for AEFI surveillance. The UNICEF senior EPI project officer and the WHO 
EPI team leader will provide technical assistance to the MOPH. At the regional and 
provincial levels, AEFI surveillance will be coordinated by the head of the regional EPI 
management team (REMT) and the provincial EPI management team (PEMT), with 
support from UNICEF regional (health technical advisor) and provincial EPI staff, as 
well as WHO Regional (regional public health coordinator) and Provincial EPI staff 
(provincial polio officers). Figure 2 shows the structure of the national EPI program at 
the central, regional, and provincial levels, with the corresponding structure of the 
UNICEF and WHO EPI teams. 
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UNICEF 
Kabul 
Sr EPI Project 
Officer 
MoH EPI Unit 
Kabul 
Natl EPI Manager 
WHO Kabul 
EPI Team Leader 
Reg UNICEF 
office 
Health Tech 
Advisor 
Regional EPI Team (REMT) 
Head of team 
Reg WHO office 
Reg Public Health 
Coord 
Prov UNICEF 
office 
Prov EPI 
Coord 
Provincial EPI Team (PEMT) 
Head of team 
Prov WHO office 
Prov Polio Off 
Figure 2. EPI management structure of MOPH, UNICEF, and WHO. 
Source: Afghanistan MOPH (2002) 
Learning and Training 
All measures should be taken to prevent AEFIs during campaigns. 
Comprehensive precampaign training of all persons involved with the campaign should 
be standard. A comprehensive module on AEFIs, along with an injection safety module, 
for the precampaign training of vaccinators, team leaders, and supervisors should be 
developed and used. This should include common AEFIs; proper vaccine preparation and 
handling; aseptic injection techniques; disposal of needles, syringes, and swabs; and risk 
communication. Campaign health workers should be aware of the local perceptions and 
information about previous AEFIs and any allegations about vaccine safety that need to 
be addressed. Campaign supervisors and monitors should be trained in the supportive 
supervision of campaign workers, highlighting the fact that the purpose of AEFI 
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monitoring is not to apportion blame to individuals but rather to prevent AEFIs from 
occurring in the first place and, if they do occur, ensuring an appropriate response. 
In addition, training to ensure the timely reporting of and appropriate responses to 
AEFIs at all levels in the system should be foreseen as the surveillance for AEFIs is 
established. AEFI surveillance and reporting should be included as an integral part of 
training of vaccinators and supervisors prior to campaigns. 
Persons responsible for AEFI surveillance at the regional and central levels need 
to be kept informed of the latest developments in safety monitoring and current concerns 
regarding immunizations. Useful Web sites related to vaccine safety are included for staff 
in the References section. Training for key staff on basic epidemiology should be 
conducted at the earliest opportunity, with past experiences cited as case studies. The 
cluster of adverse events following the MMRC campaign in Nahrin in 2002 and other 
experiences with AEFIs in other locations should be used as case studies for such 
trainings (Araki, in press). 
AEFI Surveillance and Reporting For Mass Campaigns 
Currently, AEFI surveillance in Afghanistan is limited to surveillance during and 
after mass campaigns. As the public health infrastructure in Afghanistan improves with 
enhanced surveillance of vaccine-preventable diseases, AEFI surveillance following 
routine EPI will be introduced gradually. 
An immunization campaign involves a large number of doses given over a short 
period, leading to more vaccine reactions and coincidental events. The rate of events 
remains unchanged, but the increased number of events tends to be noticed by both staff 
and the public at a time of intensive social mobilization, particularly when injectable 
vaccines are used. 
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Common AEFls in campaigns: 
• A real increase in program errors is possible with staff who are unfamiliai' with a given vaccine or 
situation and under pressure from a lot of children needing vaccine quickly: staff may not observe 
normal safe injection practices. 
• A wider age group (usually older) may be immunized, and staff have less experience in dealing with 
AEFls to be expected in this older group (e.g.. fainting) 
• Antagonism from some sectors, for a variety of reasons, which will add fuel to any concerns about 
AEFls during the campaign to justify criticism of the campaign. 
• Rumors spread rapidfy’ and damage the campaign before there is a chance to counter them. 
Priority AEFls to be Reported 
A number of diverse AEFls may occur following vaccinations. However, in the 
context of Afghanistan, priority must be given to reporting AEFls that may be due to 
program errors and/or those occurring in clusters. This will enable the timely correction 
of program errors. Table 4 (WHO, 1999) highlights the most important AEFls that should 
be reported. Appendix C outlines case definitions and treatments of common AEFls 
following measles vaccination. 
Table 4 
List of Reportable AEFls  
 Time Period Reaction  
Occurring within 24 Anaphylaxis 
hours of immunization Toxic shock syndrome (TSS)   
Occurring within 5 days Severe local reaction (e.g. swelling beyond the nearest joint; pain, 
of immunization redness & swelling of > 3 days’ duration; those requiring hospitalization) 
Sepsis 
Injection site abscess (bacteriaFsterile)  
Occurring within 3 AFP 
months of immunization  
Any death, hospitalization, or other severe and unusual events that are 
No time limit thought by health workers or the public to be related to immunization.  
Source: WHO (1999), p.23. 
It is not useful to report common, minor reactions such as mild, local reactions; 
mild fever; and self-limiting, systemic complaints. They are to be expected, and if all 
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such AEFIs were to be reported, the health care system would be overwhelmed. It is 
important, however, to make patients and/or their parents aware of the possibility of these 
reactions to allay their fears and anxieties. Severe local reactions (e.g., swelling beyond 
the nearest joint; pain, redness, and swelling of more than 3 days’ duration; events 
requiring hospitalization) should be reported, especially if they occur in clusters. Recall 
that even mild, local reactions occurring at an increased frequency and in clusters need to 
be reported because they may be indicators of program error (see Appendix B). 
Mechanism of Reporting 
Afghanistan does not have a formal AEFI surveillance system. However, AEFI 
reporting is being done in an informal manner by community members, health care 
professionals, and so on. For future campaigns, it is desirable to have a formal protocol 
for AEFI monitoring to ensure uniformity and consistency across regions. It also will 
ensure that all persons responsible for the management of the campaigns are aware of 
issues related to AEFIs and are mor,e vigilant in detecting them. This will increase the 
probability that AEFI clusters are not missed and that swift action could be taken to 
address community concerns. The surveillance system needs to be simple, flexible, and 
rapid. 
It is important to decide who will have overall responsibility and who should be 
the focal point and the spokesperson. At the central level, the MOPH national EPI 
manager will have overall responsibility and will be the focal point. At the regional and 
provincial levels, the point person will be the head of REMT and PEMT, respectively. At 
all levels, technical and logistic support will be provided by UNICEF and WHO EPI 
staff. 
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Who Should Report? 
AFP sentinel sites will be the primary mechanism of AEFI surveillance. In 
addition, reports of AEFIs should be encouraged from all possible sources, both technical 
and nontechnical. Reports could be brought by vaccinators, team leaders, or supervisors, 
and submitted to district immunization coordinators, or the head of the district health 
facility, who will be responsible for compiling reports and submitting them to the head of 
PEMT and then on to REMT. In addition, reports may be received by the district health 
facility from members of the community, or any patients who have experienced AEFI 
may themselves report for treatment at health facilities. These cases will also be reported 
to PEMT and REMT. 
When to Report? 
Ad hoc reporting of AEFIs as and when they occur should be encouraged. Health 
care workers or community members should be encouraged to report cases of AEFIs. 
Key community members (e.g., mullahs, teachers, etc.) should be informed of the 
possibility of AEFIs, and they should be instructed to report all such cases to the nearest 
health facility following the process for AFP reporting. Reports should be brought in 
writing, although no format is suggested because the reports may come from a variety of 
sources with variable literacy skills. The entire network of AFP sentinel sites arid focal 
points should be sensitized about the probability of postcampaign AEFIs and should be 
instructed to look out for cases for a period of up to 2 months following each campaign. 
In addition, two opportunities for contact between PEMT and the community should be 
utilized for active detection of AEFIs. 
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1. The provincial polio officers (PPOs) should enquire about AEFIs at the time that 
they visit district health facilities and AFP focal points. PPOs typically visit each district 
every 4 to 6 weeks and have links with a variety of health care providers. They could 
easily detect cases of AEFIs and report them to PEMT. AFP focal points and sentinel 
sites should be aware of all ongoing and future campaigns and should be instructed to 
remain vigilant for AEFIs and to promptly report them to PPOs or PEMT. 
2. Reports could also be collected from vaccinators, supervisors, and others involved 
with the campaign when the incentives are distributed after completion of the campaign. 
This typically occurs 2 to 4 weeks after the campaign. Negative reports (zero reporting) 
should be mandated and should be an essential condition for the disbursement of 
incentives. However, it should be stated clearly that reports of AEFIs will not jeopardize 
vaccinators from receiving incentives and that there will be no negative fall-out from 
AEFI reporting. 
3. Campaign monitors, particularly NID monitors, should also be instructed to look 
out for AEFIs following all campaigns. There were four NIDs planned for 2003, and the 
contact between NID monitors and the community could be used to detect AEFIs 
following the next MMRC campaigns in addition to NIDs. 
4. It is important for all AEFIs to be reported in a timely manner. Cases should be 
reported either to the district health facility or to PEMT as soon as possible. All AEFI 
clusters should ideally be reported within a week of the onset of symptoms. 
Flow of Information 
The head of PEMT or REMT, in coordination and collaboration with the head of 
the district health facility, and supported by UNICEF and WHO), will be responsible for 
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confirming all reports of AEFIs. PEMT is then responsible for reporting AEFIs to 
REMT, using the AEFI report form (see Appendix D). REMT will, in turn, report to the 
central level. 
At a minimum, AEFI reports must include: 
• Description of the event. 
• Timing of the event in relation to immunization. 
• Patient’s identifying details (name, age, sex, address). 
Additional information about the vaccine (manufacturer, lot number); diluents (if diluent used was 
provided along with the vaccine and from the same manufacturer, possibility of accidentally replacing 
diluent with another drug stored together, using nonsterile diluent or using other substances as diluent in the 
event of inadequate diluent supply, etc.); route and site of administration; details of vaccinator/supervisor; 
and outcome is also desirable. 
At the regional level, an expert committee comprising MOPH (heads of PEMT 
and REMT); UNICEF (health technical advisor); WHO (regional public health 
coordinator); and other relevant stakeholders (NGOs working in the area, etc.) will 
review the information and decide on the next steps. It must be determined if a thorough 
investigation is necessary. The EPI at the central level should be kept informed of the 
circumstances. During the entire process, regular feedback must be provided to peripheral 
health care workers and to the affected community. Figure 3 shows the structure of the 
national EPI program in the context of AEFI reporting and flow of information. All 
available modes of communications should be used to report AEFI depending on the 
location. 
All regional data should be compiled at the regional level at the office of REMT. 
Reports from all regions should be compiled at the central level in the MOPH EPI. These 
aggregated data should be analyzed following each campaign, with technical support 
from the UNICEF EPI team. 
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Figure 3. Flow of information for AEFI surveillance. 
Barriers to Reporting 
It is important to understand the barriers to AEFI reporting. Health care workers 
may not report cases of AEFIs for a number of reasons: 
1. Not relating an AEFI to immunization. 
2. Being unaware of the need for and mechanism of reporting. 
3. Lethargy. 
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4. Fear of blame. 
5. Guilt. 
6. Diffidence about reporting an AEFI when not confident of the diagnosis. 
These barriers may be overcome by: 
1. Increasing awareness of the importance of reporting, the system for reporting, and 
making the procedure easy to follow. 
2. Emphasizing that AEFI reporting and investigations are about system failures, 
finding problems, and correcting them rather than assessing blame. 
3. Providing regular, positive feedback for reporting. 
Unless health care workers appropriately process reports, an AEFI surveillance 
system will not function adequately. Health care workers must be encouraged to report 
AEFIs without fear of penalty. Rather, health care workers providing AEFI reports 
should be given some sort of recognition (e.g., a certificate or letter of appreciation). It 
should be clarified repeatedly that the main aim of this exercise is to improve the system, 
not blame individuals. 
Precampaign Preparations 
Some important precampaign preparations pertaining to the prevention and 
surveillance of AEFIs include: 
1. Stressing the preventive aspect of AEFIs by ensuring comprehensive training of 
AEFIs, along with the injection safety module, prior to campaigns for vaccinators, team 
leaders, supervisors, and campaign monitors. 
2. Establishing a system for AEFI surveillance involving all stakeholders. 
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3. Raising awareness of the AEFIs reporting mechanisms among all personnel 
involved in the campaign. This should include a description of possible AEFIs and their 
appropriate management and response. 
4. Sending a message to all AFP sentinel sites to ensure that they are particularly 
vigilant in detecting any AEFIs for a period of 2 months postcampaign. 
5. Ensuring adequate supervision for all vaccination teams. 
6. Ensuring inclusion of injection safety components in the campaign supervisory 
checklist. 
7. Ensuring good logistic support and contingency planning to deal with unexpected 
situations such as a shortage of diluents, sterile syringes, and so on. 
8. Tracking the number of doses distributed by: 
a. Antigen. 
b. Vaccine lot. 
c. Destination point. 
Responding to AEFIs 
A rapid response to reports of AEFIs is important and is the main point of AEFI 
surveillance. Health care workers need to be aware of possible AEFIs and how to treat 
them. Recall that Appendix C outlines the major AEFIs following various commonly 
used vaccines and mentions possible treatment options. 
Investigating Reports of AEFIs 
Once a report has been received by REMT, an assessment should be made to 
determine if further investigation is required. In large campaigns, the number of AEFIs 
will naturally increase with increased vaccine use. It is essential to calculate the adverse 
reaction-reporting rate based on estimated vaccine use. It is usually the rate, not the 
whole number, of events that requires investigation (see below). 
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The rate of occurrence of AEFIs: 
Rate of AEFI = # of cases of AEFI reported x 100,000 
# of vaccine doses administered 
Compare the figure with the expected rale of AEFI in Table 2, and determine if there is a real increase in 
AEFIs. However, all clusters of AEFIs should be investigated, irrespective of the size of clusters, because 
they are likely to be due to program errors. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 25. 
Improved reporting can lead to more AEFI reports without a real increase in 
reaction rate. The investigation needs to determine if there is a real increase in reaction 
rate as well as to identify possible causes. For example, a change in vaccine manufacturer 
or vaccine lot can lead to a change in reaction rate. 
The Regional Expert Committee will discuss available information and decide on 
the next steps. If the cause of an AEFI is clear, and if corrective action is necessary, it can 
be instituted immediately. If further investigation is needed to determine the cause of an 
AEFI, REMT can institute the investigation with UNICEF and WHO support. 
In general, a report of an AEFI needs investigation if it: 
• Is part of a cluster of similar events. 
• Is a serious event of unexplained cause. 
• Causes significant community concern. 
Who Should Investigate? 
The investigation should be performed by a team comprised of personnel from 
REMT, PEMT, UNICEF, and WHO. The exact composition of the team should be 
specified by the expert regional committee when a decision is made to conduct an 
investigation. PEMT should be fully involved in the investigation because of their 
comprehensive local knowledge of the area as well as their capacity building opportunity 
so that they may take on a more frontline role in future investigations. Where there are 
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limitations in the capacity to conduct AEFI investigations at the regional level, REMT 
can call upon technical expertise from the central EPI unit who will provide the necessary 
support in liaison with UNICEF and WHO. 
When to Investigate? 
Depending on the magnitude and extent of the problem, an investigation should 
be started as soon as possible. In light of the constraints on travel because of limited 
logistic capacity, weather, security, and other factors, it may be difficult to propose an 
accurate time line. As a general guideline, a decision to investigate should be taken 
within 24 to 48 hours of receiving a report from PEMT. Once a decision is made, an 
investigation should be initiated within 3 to 5 days and should be considered a high- 
priority activity. Timeliness is critical for a successful investigation. As time passes, it 
may be difficult to locate cases and/or key informants, and reports will be subject to 
recall errors. In addition, it may be impossible to collect specimens for laboratory testing 
if an investigation is initiated long after the event. 
How to Investigate? 
It is important to investigate reports of AEFIs promptly and completely. 
Investigators will need to examine cases for themselves and gather information from the 
patient, guardian, health workers, vaccinators, team leaders, supervisors, and community 
members. 
A cluster of similar AEFIs is likely to arise from program errors and warrants a 
rapid and comprehensive investigation to identify the source. If the event also occurred in 
unimmunized persons, it may possibly be coincidental. It is important to identify if 
unimmunized people also developed similar symptoms during the same period of time. 
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Investigation of a cluster requires: 
• Establishing a case definition for the event (if not a well-defined AEFI). 
• Identifying all the people in the area who have an illness that meets the case definition. 
• Obtaining immunization histories (when and where vaccination occurred and w'hich vaccines and 
diluent, including lot numbers, were given). 
• Identifying any common exposures among the cases. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 29. 
If all, or most, cases receive vaccines from the same health worker/facility, and if 
there are no other cases, program error is likely. If all cases receive the same vaccine lot, 
and if there are no similar unimmunized cases in the community, a problem with the 
vaccine is likely. This must be reported to REMT, who will alert WHO. If the AEFI is a 
known vaccine reaction but is occurring at an increased rate, a program error or a vaccine 
problem is the likely cause. Finally, if cases include people from the same area in the 
same age group who were not immunized, then the event is probably coincidental. A 
simple flow chart for identifying the cause of an AEFI is outlined in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Flow chart for identifying cause of AEFI cluster. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 29. 
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Outline of an Investigation 
An AEFI investigation follows standard epidemiological investigation principles. 
In addition, an investigation of the vaccine, immunization techniques, and procedures 
needs to be conducted (see Table 5). 
Table 5 
Steps in an AEFI Investigation 
Step Action 
1. Confirm information in 
report 
Obtain patient’s medical records 
Document details about patient through review of medical records 
Obtain details missing from AEFI report form 
dentifi/ any other cases that needs to be included in the investigation 
2. Investigate and collect 
data 
a. About the patient 
b. About the event 
c. About the suspected 
vaccine/diluent 
Immunization history 
Previous medical history, particularly h/o similar reactions or 
allergies 
Family history of similar events  
History, clinical description, lab results, diagnosis 
Treatment, treatment location, and outcome  
Vaccine and shipping storage conditions 
Storage of vaccine prior to arrival to administration site, source, 
assessment of vaccine monitor card 
d. About other people Whether others received same vaccine and developed illness 
Whether others had similar illness; if they were exposed to suspected 
vaccme 
Investigation of vaccine-administering service 
3. Assess vaccme service 
delivery 
a. Inquire into 
b. Observe 
Vaccme storage, distribution, and disposal 
Diluent storage and distribution 
Reconstitution process and time 
Use and sterilization of syringes and needles 
Details of training in immunization practice and supervision 
If number of immunizations given were greater than expected 
Refrigerator - Note other contents of refrigerator, labels on vials, 
storage of medications 
Immunization procedures (reconstitution, drawing up vaccine, 
injection techniques, safety of needles and syringes, disposal of open 
vials) 
Evidence of vial contamination 
4. Formulate working 
hypothesis  
The likely/possible cause of the event 
5. Test working 
hypothesis 
Does case distribution match working hypothesis? 
Use lab tests if necessary/feasible  
6. Conclude investigation Reach a conclusion 
Complete AEFI investigation form and write report 
Take corrective action, and recommend further action 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 30. 
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A series of cases without comparison of disease and exposure among controls is 
not likely to reveal the cause of AEFIs, except in the case of program errors. Clear case 
definitions, defined during the investigation, are essential. The investigation needs to 
identify all cases of disease in the community similar to the reported AEFIs and 
determine the outcome of these cases. The risk of disease should be compared for those 
who received the vaccine versus those who did not. It may be necessary to perform a case 
control study to determine the cause of AEFIs. Technical support to perform an in-depth 
study can be sought from the regional or national offices of UNICEF and WHO. In rare 
instances, it may be necessary to invite external consultants to assist with an 
investigation. 
A working hypothesis should be established as soon as there is sufficient 
information. The working hypothesis may change during the course of the investigation. 
The focus of the investigation should then be to seek to confirm the working hypothesis. 
No action should be taken based on the hypothesis until it is confirmed with reasonable 
certainty. An AEFI investigation form (see Appendix E) should be completed at the end 
of the investigation. 
Laboratory testing may be relevant in certain circumstances, but it will be difficult 
in the context of Afghanistan. It is not mandated for AEFI investigations in Afghanistan. 
However, in cases of abscesses due to vaccinations, it is desirable to culture the offending 
organism to determine the cause and to guide appropriate antibiotic therapy. In rare 
instances, it may be appropriate to test the suspected vaccine and diluent for sterility. 
However, this should only be performed when there is a clear indication and after the 
formulation of a working hypothesis. 
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Causality Assessment 
The investigation needs to include an assessment of the cause of the AEFIs. The 
WHO classification of AEFIs has six categories: 
1. Very likely/certain 
2. Probable 
3. Possible 
4. Unlikely 
5. Unrelated 
6. Unclassifiable 
For AEFIs, the first three categories are used when a vaccine reaction or a 
program error is suspected with varying levels of confidence. Categories 4 and 5 would 
be used for coincidental events, depending on level of confidence, and category 6 would 
be used for AEFIs where insufficient evidence is provided to make an assessment. 
Useful questions to assess causality: 
• What is the frequency of occuiTence of the event (common/rare/not previously reported)? 
• Are similar AEFIs known to occur with other diseases? 
• Is the AEFI known to be related to the vaccine? 
• Is the AEFI explainable by the biological properties of the vaccine? 
• Is the vaccine-event interval compatible with expected? 
• Has the patient had similar symptoms in the past? 
• Was the patient on any concomitant or preceding drug therapy? 
• Did the patient have any concomitant or preceding condition? 
• Were there any other contributing factors? 
It is never appropriate to discontinue the immunization campaign while waiting for the 
completion of the investigation. 
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Communicating with the Community 
Upon completion of the investigation, the cause of an AEFI needs to be 
communicated to the community. This must include information about the steps being 
taken to remedy the situation and to prevent a recurrence. 
Trust is a key component of the exchange of information at every level, and an 
overconfidence about risk estimates that are later shown to be incorrect contributes to a 
breakdown of trust among the people involved. Admit uncertainty, investigate fully, and 
keep the community informed. Avoid making a premature statement about the cause of 
an AEFI before the investigation is complete. If the cause is identified as program error, 
it is vital not to lay personal blame on anyone, but to focus on system-related problems 
that resulted in the program error(s) and the steps being taken to correct the problem. 
Communicating Directly with Community Leaders 
In communicating with the community, it is useful to develop links with 
community leaders and peripheral health care workers so that information can be 
disseminated rapidly. Maintaining lines of communication with the community is 
important throughout the investigation. The head of PEMT or REMT will be responsible 
for communications with the committee, with support of UNICEF and WHO provincial 
teams. Feedback should also be provided to the health care workers or community 
members who reported cases of AEFIs, and their contributions should be commended. 
Communicating with the Media 
The media (newspaper, radio, and television) play an important role in public 
perception. Understanding what the media want from a story will assist communication 
with them (see Appendix F). 
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In certain situations, media coverage is likely to raise public concern about 
immunization. In these situations, it is important to communicate with professional 
organizations, health professionals, and workers before the media. The communication 
should include preparations on how to deal with public concern on this issue to minimize 
the potential harm. It is also useful to have other groups and individuals that have public 
respect and authority to make public comments to endorse and strengthen key messages. 
Designating the spokesperson(s) to communicate with the media limits the 
possibility of conflicting messages coming from different sources. The spokesperson 
should have some training in media relations and should be designated and trained before 
any vaccine safety issues arise in order to develop a relationship with key reporters. The 
head of REMT or PEMT will be responsible for dealing with the media at the local level. 
At the national level, the national EPI manager will be the person responsible for liaison 
with the media. In all cases (and at all levels), support will be provided by UNICEF and 
WHO staff 
When there is a high level of concern about a vaccine, communication >vith the community (and the 
media, if appropriate) can emphasize that: 
• The known benefits of immunization in preventing serious disease, compared to the uncertainty if the 
AEFI(s). are truly caused by the vaccine (presenting data on disease risks vs. risks of vaccine reactions 
and vaccine effectiveness may be useful). 
• The remediable program error or coincidental illness is much more likely to be the cause of the AEFI 
than serious vaccine reactions because serious vaccine reactions are very rare. 
• The appropriate action is being taken to safeguard the public.  
Fixing the Problem 
The remedy for an AEFI will depend on the cause, if a cause can, indeed, be 
identified. In all cases, the investigation needs to be clearly documented. It is also useful 
to disseminate the results of the investigation widely so that others can learn from the 
experience. It can be a teaching resource in the future. 
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Program errors will need to be corrected promptly, and there should be a 
mechanism in place to ensure that the error does not happen again. If a specific vaccine 
lot is implicated, withdrawal of the entire lot and a change in supplier may be warranted. 
WHO will then contact the supplier, and batch testing will be completed. In the case of 
coincidental events, the main task is communication to avoid assessing false blame. 
Decisions to suspend the use of or to recall vaccines of a particular lot need to be 
made swiftly, but they also must be well thought out. The impact on the immunization 
program, alternate sources of vaccine, and the reliability of the evidence on which the 
decision is based need careful scrutiny. In particular, there needs to be consideration of 
the possibility of biased reporting resulting from an alert about a possible problem with a 
vaccine or a lot. Consultation with the vaccine manufacturer and UNICEF/WHO is 
advisable before making that decision. 
It is essential to ensure that all cases of AEFIs be provided with prompt and 
appropriate treatment free of cost. The head of PEMT should ensure that the appropriate 
treatment is provided, and the MOPH should bear the cost of the treatment. UNICEF will 
later make available reimbursement for this expense through its regional office. Such 
potential expenses should be budgeted for by UNICEF under campaign costs. 
It should be emphasized that no individual should be personally blamed for cases 
of AEFIs. Any AEFI should be seen as a learning opportunity to improve the quality of 
future campaigns. The MOPH should shoulder all responsibility for cases of AEFIs, be 
responsible for the appropriate responses, and ensure that avoidable AEFIs happen to the 
extent possible in the future. 
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Table 6 
Actions to be Taken Upon Completion of the Investigation 
Vaccine Reaction If a higher reaction rate than expected from a specific vaccine or lot, then 
obtain information from the manufacturer and consult with WHO to consider: 
• Withdrawing that lot. 
• Notify WHO, which will then contact the manufacturer 
• Obtaining vaccine from a different manufacturer.  
Program Error Correcting the cause of the error. This may involve: 
• Change in logistics for supplying vaccine. 
• Change in procedures at the health facility. 
• Training of health workers. 
• Intensified supervision. 
Whatever action may have been taken, it is necessary to evaluate that the errors 
have been rectified. 
Coincidental Events Main task is communication to ensure that people are convinced that the 
AEFIs were coincidental. Such AEFIs may harm the immunization program 
through false attribution of blame. 
Sometimes further expert investigation may be required to convince/ensure 
that the AEFI was truly coincidental.  
Unknown Events Depending on the extent and nature of the AEFI and whether it is ongoing, a 
further expert investigation may be required, although it must be accepted 
that in some cases, the relationship to immunization is not clear. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 37. 
Finally, it is essential that a comprehensive report is prepared at the end of each 
investigation no later than a month after its conclusion. The report should contain all 
details of the investigation: dates, participants, methodology, conclusions, and 
recommendations for corrective actions. 
Evaluation of the AEFI Surveillance System 
The AEFI surveillance system should be evaluated regularly to determine its 
effectiveness. This should preferably be performed after each mass campaign. 
Information gained from the evaluations will guide future adjustments of the surveillance 
system as the capacity of the public health infrastructure improves and as the needs of the 
system change. Criteria listed here may be used to evaluate the system. 
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Criteria for evaluating the AEFI Surveillance System 
• Timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of AEFI reporting 
• Timeliness and completeness of AEFI investigation 
• Audit of corrective action taken 
• Sensitivity of the AEFI surveillance system 
To assess the sensitivity of the system, injection safety questions should be added 
to all postcampaign coverage surveys. A simple question that should be added to the 
coverage survey following campaigns is, “After the vaccination, did your child 
experience any problem? If yes, please describe.” (Keep open-ended. Can be assessed 
and categorized during data entry). Finally, AEFI data should be presented and discussed 
at the annual EPI review meeting. This meeting also should address lessons learned in 
AEFI surveillance during campaigns over the past year and should help to make relevant 
changes to improve its effectiveness. 
Recommendations 
After the AEFI follow-up tool is developed, the author recommends that these 
steps be implemented: 
1. Education and training for AEFI follow-up for all providers who deliver vaccine 
services. 
2. Utilization of the tool for consistent, systematic follow-up of AEFIs to ensure best 
practice. 
3. Following each mass immunization campaign, an evaluation of AEFI follow-up 
should be completed by REMT and forwarded to the national EPI manager. 
4. Evidence-based reporting of AEFIs can assist in the expansion of research for 
AEFIs in Afghanistan that may be beneficial learning for others who assist with vaccine 
delivery in mass campaigns. 
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5. Once AEFI follow-up is occurring consistently and effectively after mass 
immunization campaigns, AEFI surveillance should be extended to routine immunization 
services. 
6. Evaluation of the AEFI tool to determine its effectiveness and validity should 
occur one year after implementation. 
Summary 
The author reviewed the literature related to AEFIs, utilized a framework based 
on Evans and Stoddart’s (1990) health field model, and described global initiatives in 
AEFI follow-up. A simple survey was utilized to gather information on current AEFI 
follow-up in Afghanistan. Following the discussion of the survey results, input from 
managers of EPI, and guidance from UNICEF and WHO, the author described her role in 
the development of a tool for investigating and reporting AEFIs to the Afghanistan 
MOPH. Although almost half of Afghanistan’s children remain unimmunized because of 
the country’s poor health care infrastructure and political instability, those who do are 
immunized must trust that the vaccines are beneficial and delivered in a safe manner. If 
problems do arise, this tool will provide a systematic way to report and investigate 
vaccine-related AEFIs so that future vaccine programs are not jeopardized. 
55 
REFERENCES 
Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health. (2002). Health annual report 2002. Kabul, 
Afghanistan: Author. 
Araki, D. (in press). Adverse events following nationwide mass vaccination against 
measles, Afghanistan, 2002. 
Assefa, F., Jabarkhil, M. Z., Salama, P., & Spiegel, P. (2001). Malnutrition and mortality 
in Kohistan District, Afghanistan. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
286, 2123-212%. 
Centers for Disease Control. (2001). Nationwide campaign for vaccination of adults 
against rubella and measles-Costa Rica. Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report, 50, 
976-979. 
th Chen, R. T., Davis, R., & Sheedy, K. (2004). Safety of immunizations vaccines (4 ed.). 
Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier. 
Chen R. T., Rastogi, S. C., Mullen, J. R., Hayes, S., Cochi, S. L., Donlon, J. A., et al. 
(1994). The vaccine adverse event reporting system (VAERS). Vaccine, 12, 542- 
550. 
Dadgar, N., Ansari, A., Naleo, T., Brennan, M., Salama, P., Sadozai, N., et al. (2003). 
Implementation of a mass measles campaign in central Afghanistan, December 
2001 to May 2002. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 187, S186-S190. 
Daly, P., & Pielak, K. (1997). The 1996 measles elimination campaign in British 
Columbia: Measles update. Retrieved October 20, 2005, from 
http ://www.hc. sc. gc. ca/hpb/lcdc/publicat/measles/mes 15 -2 .html 
56 
De Wals, P., Dionne, M., Douville-Fradet, M., Boulianne, N., Drapeau, J., & De Serres, 
G. (1996), Impact of mass immunization campaign against serogroup C 
meningococcus in the province of Quebec, Canada. Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, 7^(4), 407-411. 
Dietz, V., & Cutts, F. (1997). The use of mass immunization campaigns in the expanded 
programme of immunization: A review of reported advantages and disadvantages. 
InternationalJournal of Health Services, 27, 767-790. 
Evans, R. G., & Stoddart, G. I. (1990). Producing health, consuming health care. Social 
Science and Medicine, 31, 1359. 
Hadler, S., Cochi, S., Bilous, J., & Cutts, F. (2004). Vaccination programs in developing 
countries. In S. L. Plotkin & W. Orenstein (Eds.), Vaccine (4^^ ed., pp. 1407- 
1442). Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier. 
Howson, C. P., Howe, C. J., & Fineberg, H. V. (Eds.). (1991). Adverse effects of pertussis 
and rubella vaccines: A report of the committee to review the adverse 
consequences of pertussis and rubella vaccines. Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press. 
lon-Nedelcu, N., Craciun, D., & Pitigoi, D. (2001). Measles elimination: A mass 
immunization campaign in Romania. American Journal of Public Health, 91, 
1042-1045. 
Neutens, J., & Rubinson, L. (2002) Research techniques for the health sciences (3*^^* ed.). 
San Francisco: Pearson. 
57 
Miller, M., & Turner, N. (2002). Suggestions for improving the monitoring of adverse 
events following immunization in New Zealand. New Zealand Medical Journal, 
775(1162), U186. 
Orenstein,W., Rodewald, L., & Hinman, A. (2004). Immunization in the United States. In 
S. L. Plotkin & W. Orenstein (Eds.), Vaccine (4^^ ed., pp. 1357-1386). 
Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier. 
Pless, R., Bentsi-Enchill, A., & Duclos, P. (2003). Monitoring vaccine safety during 
measles mass immunization campaigns: Clinical and programmatic issues. 
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 757(Suppl. 1), S291-S298. 
Plotkin, S. L., & Plotkin, S. A. (2004). A short history of vaccination. In S. L. Plotkin & 
W. Orenstein (Eds.), Vaccine (4 ed., pp. 1-16). Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier. 
Public Health Agency of Canada. (2002). Canadian immunization guide (6^^ ed.). Ottawa, 
ON: Author. 
Public Health Agency of Canada. (2003). National immunization strategy: Final report. 
Retrieved March 2005 from 
http://www.phacaspc.gc.ca/publicat/nat_immunization_03/index.html 
Reilly, B., Puertas, G., & Coutin, A. (2004). The battle for access-Health care in 
Afghamstan. New England Journal of Medicine, 350(19), 1927-1929. 
Salisbury, D. (2002). The immunization program in England. Proceedings of the 25th 
National Immunization Conference, xx, 49-52. 
Sciberras, J. (1996). Adverse vaccine events reported during the Ontario measles 
immunization campaign. Ontario Public Health Epidemiological Report, 7, 7-12. 
58 
Shepard, D. S., Robertson, R. L., Cameron, C. S., Satumo, P., Pollack, M., Manceau, J., 
et al. (1989). Cost-effectiveness of routine and campaign vaccination strategies in 
Ecuador. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 67(6), 649-662. 
Stratton, K. R., Howe, C. J., & Johnston, R. B. (Eds.). (1994). Adverse events associated 
with childhood vaccines: Evidence bearing on causality. Washington DC: 
National Academy Press. 
United Nations Children’s Fund. (2002). Afghanistan maternal mortality survey. Kabal: 
Author. 
United Nations Children’s Fund. (2004a). The state of the world’s children 2005: 
Childhood under threat. New York: Author. 
United Nations Children’s Fund. (2004b). Statistical data by country. Afghanistan. 
Retrieved January 20, 2005, from http://www.unicef.org/ststis/Country_l.html 
United Nations Children’s Fund. (2005). Building trust and responding to adverse events 
following immunization in South Asia: Using strategic communication: A working 
paper. Katmandu, Nepal: Author. 
World Health Organization. (1988). Global eradication of poliomyelitis by the year 2000. 
Weekly Epidemiological Record, 63, 161-162. 
World Health Organization. (1991). Expanded programme on immunization. Training for 
midlevel managers-increasing immunization coverage. Geneva: Author. 
World Health Organization. (1999). Immunization safety surveillance: Guidelines for 
managers of immunization programmes on reporting and investigating adverse 
events following immunization. Geneva: Author. 
59 
World Health Organization. (2002). Report on the state of the world’s vaccines and 
immunizations. Geneva: Author. 
World Health Organization. (2004). Outbreak data by country: Afghanistan. Retrieved 
February 6, 2005, from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2005_01_08a/en/ 
Yang, B. (2001). Analysis of the adverse events after measles mass catch-up campaign in 
the Republic of Korea. Paper presented at the first-year evaluation of the 5-Year 
Measles Elimination Program in Korea, Seoul, South Korea. 
60 
APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire to Assess AEFI Reporting and Follow-Up 
The World Health Organization defines an adverse event following 
immunization as “any adverse event that follows immunization that is 
believed to be caused by the vaccination.” 
1. What is your current title? 
□ EPI manager 
□ Vaccinator 
□ Physician 
□ Nurse 
□ Other (Please explain)  
2. Have you ever seen an Adverse Event Following Immunization? 
□ Yes (if so, explain what you have seen) 
□ No 
3. What do you do if you see a child experiencing an adverse event following immunization? 
Explain  
4. Do you have any resources to assist you with follow up of adverse events? 
□ Yes (if yes what do you use?)  
□ No (if no, what do you need?)  
5. What further kind of information/resources do you need to help you with adverse event following 
immunization follow up? 
□ Guidelines to follow 
□ 
□ 
Clear reporting structure 
Training to understand adverse event follow up 
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□ Other (please provide other ideas) 
Thank you for your time and assistance! 
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APPENDIX B 
AEFI Line Listing 
A line listing form may be used at the provincial level to identify trends and 
Establishing codes for area, reaction type, cause of AEFI, and certainty of cause will 
facilitate recording, data entry, and analysis. Because of the potential for coding errors, 
the code should be double-checked. 
An example of coding for the cause of an AEFI is shown here: 
1. Program error 
A) Nonsterile injection 
B) Vaccine prepared incorrectly 
C) Administration technique/site 
D) Vaccine transportation/ 
storage 
E) Other: 
2. Vaccine reaction 
A) Vaccine manufacturer error 
B) Known vaccine reaction at 
expected rate 
C) Other: 
3. Coincidental 
A) Similar event in 
unimmunized persons 
B) Other: 
4. Unknown 
Thus: Code ‘ 1 A’ would be for program error [non-sterile injection] 
Code ‘2B’ would be vaccine reaction [known vaccine reaction at expected rate], 
etc. 
Coding for confidence could be: certain = 1 probable = 2 possible = 3. 
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APPENDIX C 
AEFI Case Definitions and Treatments 
Adverse Event Case Definition Treatment 
Anaphylactoid 
reaction (acute 
hypersensitivity 
reaction) 
Exaggerated acute allergic reaction, occurring within 2 
hours after immunization, characterized by one or more 
of the following: 
wheezing and shortness of breath due to 
bronchospasm 
laryngospasm/laryngeal edema 
one or more skin manifestations (e.g., hives, facial 
edema, or generalized edema). 
Less severe allergic reactions do not need to be 
reported.  
Self-limiting; anti- 
histamines may be 
helpful. 
Anaphylaxis Severe immediate (within one hour) allergic reaction 
leading to circulatory failure with or without 
bronchospasm and/or laryngospasm/laryngeal edema. 
Adrenaline injection. 
Encephalopathy Acute onset of major illness characterized by any two of 
the following three conditions: 
seizures 
severe alteration in level of consciousness lasting for 
one day or more 
distinct change in behavior lasting one day or more. 
Needs to occur between 6 to 12 days after measles or 
MMR vaccine, to be related to immunization. 
No specific treatment 
available; supportive 
care. 
Fever The fever can be classified (based on rectal temperature) 
as mild (38 to 38.9°C), high (39 to 40.4°C) and extreme 
(40.5‘’C or higher). Fever on its own does not need to be 
reported.  
Symptomatic; 
paracetamol 
(acetaminophen) 
Injection site 
abscess 
Fluctuant or draining fluid-filled lesion at the site of 
injection. Bacterial if evidence of infection (e.g., 
purulent, inflammatory signs, fever, culture), sterile 
abscess if not. 
Incise and drain; 
antibiotics if 
bacterial. 
Seizures Occurrence of generalized convulsions that are not 
accompanied by focal neurological signs or symptoms. 
Febrile seizures: if temperature elevated >38°C (rectal) 
Afebrile seizures: if temperature normal 
Self-limiting; 
supportive care; 
paracetamol and 
cooling if febrile; 
rarely 
anticonvulsants. 
Sepsis Acute onset of severe generalized illness due to 
bacterial infection and confirmed (if possible) by 
positive blood culture. Needs to be reported as possible 
indicator of program error. 
Critical to recognize 
and treat early. 
Urgent transfer to 
hospital for parenteral 
antibiotics and fluids. 
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Adverse Event Case Definition Treatment 
Severe local 
reaction 
Redness and/or swelling centered at the site of injection 
and one or more of the following: 
swelling beyond the nearest joint 
pain, redness, and swelling of more than 3 days 
duration 
requires hospitalization. 
Local reactions of lesser intensity occur commonly, 
are trivial and do not need to be reported. 
Settles spontaneously 
within a few days to a 
week. 
Symptomatic 
treatment with 
analgesics. 
Antibiotics are 
inappropriate. 
Thrombocytopenia Serum platelet count of less than 50,000/ml leading to 
bruising and/or bleeding 
Usually mild and 
self-limiting; 
occasionally may 
need steroid or 
platelets.  
Toxic shock 
syndrome (TSS) 
Abrupt onset of fever, vomiting and watery diarrhea 
within a few hours of immunization. Often leading to 
death within 24 to 48 hours. Needs to be reported as 
possible indicator of program error. 
Critical to recognize 
and treat early. 
Urgent transfer to 
hospital for parenteral 
antibiotics and fluids. 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 41. 
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APPENDIX D 
AEFI Report Form 
Family name: First name: Date of birth 
(dd/mm/yy): 
/ / 
Unique ID: 
Address: Sex: 
Male/Female 
Ethnicity: 
District: Province: 
Health facility: Reporter (health 
worker): 
Vaccine(s) given^ Route Site Lot number Manufacturer Expiry date 
'^name and dose number e.g., DPT-2, OPV-2; diluent too, if reconstituted 
Date immunized Date AEFI started Onset interval Date of report 
Tick box(es) and describe event: 
Toxic shock syndrome 
Sepsis 
Abscess: sterile or bacterial 
Severe local reaction: >3 days, beyond nearest 
joint, or hospitalized 
Vaccine reaction on list (state): 
Other AEFI (state):    
Recovered: 
Hospitalized: 
Died: 
Yes / No / ? 
Yes / No / ? 
Yes / No / ? 
Past medical history (including history of similar 
reaction or other allergies) and any other relevant 
information (e.g., other cases): 
Province Level Office to complete: 
Date report received: / / Checked by: 
Investigation needed: Yes / No / ? If yes, date started: 
Investigator: AEFI investigation ID: 
Causality assessment: Certainty: 
Certain / Probable / Possible 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 50. 
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APPENDIX E 
AEFI Investigation Form 
Complete this summary page at end of investigation; file with field report and AEFI 
report forms  
Investigation ID: AEFI Repon ID: Date Investigation Started: / / 
Describe trigger event: 
Diagnosis/case definition of event: 
Community investigation: ^Yes /No 
suspect vaccine in time window: Immunized 
If yes, number of cases immunized with 
Not Immunized 
Clinic investigation carried out: /Yes / No If yes, key fmding(s): 
Laboratory investigation(s): /Yes / No If yes, key result(s): 
Assessment 
Conclusion about cause of AEFI: Tick categories and rank if more than one cause: 
Program Error 
- Non-sterile injection 
- Vaccine prepared 
incorrectly 
- Administration 
technique/site 
- Vaccine 
transportation /storage 
- Other: 
Vaccine Reaction 
- Vaccine lot problem 
- Known vaccine 
reaction at expected rate 
- Other: 
Coincidental 
- Similar event in 
unimmunized 
- Other: 
Unknown 
Confidence about conclusion on main cause of AEFI: 
Certain Probable Possible 
Reason(s) for conclusion: 
Corrective action taken: Yes 
If yes, specify. If not, specify why not. 
No 
Further actions recommended: 
If yes, specify 
Yes No 
Investigator: 
/ / 
Signature: Date: 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 51. 
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APPENDIX F 
Communicating with the Media 
Risk communication is an interactive process that requires active listening and 
discussion. Individuals differ in their perceptions of risk, depending on their life 
experience and knowledge. Certain risks are more acceptable to people than other risks. 
If possible, reframe risks using that framework (e.g., emphasizing extensive international 
use of vaccines and known risks). 
Perceptions of risk 
Les.s Risk Greater Risk 
Voluntary vs. Involuntary 
Individual control vs. System control 
Omission vs. Commission 
Natural vs. Manmade 
Memorable vs. Not memorable 
Knowable vs. Unknowable 
Not dreaded vs. Dreaded 
Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy 
Familiar vs. Exotic 
Source: WHO (1999), p. 53. 
The guiding principle with dealing with the media must be one of honesty and 
building up trust. The effectiveness of our communication is largely determined by 
whether the audiences perceive us to be trustworthy and believable. Trust and credibility 
are difficult to achieve; if lost, they are even more difficult to regain. Public assessment 
of how much we can be trusted and believed is based upon four factors: 
• Empathy and caring. 
• Competence and expertise. 
• Honesty and openness. 
• Dedication and commitment. 
It is vital to prepare before any media contact with: 
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• Key messages. 
• Answers to likely and awkward questions. 
• Identifying which issues not to respond to (e.g., blaming an individual or 
speculating on the cause before the investigation is complete). 
Messages need to be as simple as possible. Use simple words and short sentences. 
It is helpful to tell a story, when possible - create a ‘word picture’ to get the message 
across. The key messages should be kept to a minimum and are likely to include some of 
these facts: 
• That benefit of immunization in preventing disease is well known. 
• It is very risky not to immunize (risk of disease and complications). 
• Vaccine-preventable diseases caused millions of death and/or disability before the 
introduction of vaccines, and that situation would return without the continued use of 
vaccines. 
• Vaccines do cause reactions, but these are rarely serious and hardly ever cause 
long-term problems (use Tables 2 and 3 to outline known risks of suspect vaccine [s]) 
• Immunization safety is of paramount importance, and any suspicion of a problem 
is investigated (advantage of well-established immunization safety surveillance). 
• The AEFI is currently being investigated, but it is likely to be coincidental/due to 
a local problem (depending on type of event), and the immunization program must 
continue to keep the population safe from disease. 
• Action is being taken. 
It is essential to present information to the media in a way that will generate a sense 
of credibility and confidence by being: 
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• Honest - never lie; if you do not know, say so, but promise to find out (e.g., “We 
don’t know at this time, but we have taken steps to answer that question”); note that a lie 
or a cover-up can become a bigger news story than the initial event. 
• Caring - create a strong, compassionate, competent image for yourself and the 
service. 
• Clear - avoid jargon; use simple phrases and give examples to clarify meaning. 
• Serious - jokes can be disastrous, and the subject is rarely amusing an}^ay. 
• Aware of body language - it is of critical importance in perceptions. 
• Responsible - do not be defensive, but accept responsibility appropriate to your 
position and avoid blaming someone else (e.g., “We will see if there is any truth in the 
report”). 
• Responsive - hold a daily press conference if that is what is needed to meet the 
needs of the pubic and media; regular contact helps build a trusting relationship with the 
media. 
• Positive - reframe the situation in positive terms; use terms such as vaccine safety 
(which has a positive connotation) rather than adverse event. 
When facing a hostile interviewer, prepare these techniques: 
• Block - respond to a negative question with a positive answer (e.g., when asked, 
“How many children have died from immunization?” answer: “Immunization saves lives. 
Since our immunization program began, ‘X’ children have been immunized, and of those 
numbers, ‘ Y’% might have died from one of these diseases. That is the context in which 
we must consider the tragic, but thankfully, rare adverse events that follow 
immunization.” 
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• Bridge - having answered a difficult question, move quickly to something linked 
but positive. 
• Correct what is wrong - immediately correct information from the interviewer 
that is wrong. Be assertive, not aggressive, and state the facts simply, factually, and in a 
friendly way. 
• Stay cool - no matter how bad it gets, don’t get angry or defensive; stay friendly, 
polite, and warm. 
• Be assertive - means stating what you want to say in a clear way without getting 
aggressive; take time to think about the response, and don’t be rushed or forced. 
Bridge technique 
Question: Does vaccination cause abscesses? 
Answer: (Face the element of truth) We know that vaccinations may rarely cause 
abscesses, (here comes the first bridge....) That is why we train staff to avoid them by 
using a sterile needle and syringe for every child. (Now comes the second bridge) When 
combining this policy with purchasing only the highest quality vaccines approved by 
WHO and UNICEF, we are able to assure parents that we have one of the safest vaccine 
programs in the world. 
